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Abstract 
The rise in the popularity of internet-based digital video has created a major 
revolution in the way consumers acquire content. Users no longer need to watch a 
television show live or obtain a physical disc in order to view a movie. However, this 
transition comes with a price: Digital Rights Management (DRM). Every digital video 
file requires a user to be locked into a particular combination of software, hardware, and 
business plan in order to be authorized for viewing purchased content. DRM was just as 
prevalent during the introduction of digital audio, but DRM was abolished from the 
format within four years. The goal of this paper is to attempt to divine the future of DRM 
and digital video by comparing the current marketplace to the case study of digital audio. 
In order to estimate the lifespan of video DRM, this paper first examined the 
history of audio DRM and the factors that led to its demise. Two key factors were 
discovered: technological innovations that helped push audio piracy into the mainstream 
and the market forces that forced the copyright holders to relax their DRM requirements. 
Those factors were used to analyze the current state of video DRM. While disruptive 
technologies are still being developed to compete against DRM, a combination of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act's stifling of innovation and the rise of online streaming 
content has prevented the creation of a universal technological solution that would push 
for DRM-free video. As for the market forces, users treat video content differently than 
audio. Video content is more disposable, with users preferring to rent content for a single 
viewing while digital audio lends itself to an ownership culture. This difference in how 
users treat their content does not create the level of piracy necessary to make DRM-free 
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digital video a reality. The paper concludes that despite the internet's massive ability for 
the free dissemination of data, digital video DRM will be a factor in the foreseeable 
future. 
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Introduction 
Three examples make a trend. Consider these: a computer company getting into 
the home theater PC business admits the main use of its product is watching 
illegally downloaded movies. An executive of a consumer electronics company 
says that if pornography helped popularize technologies like videotape a 
generation ago, then music and movie piracy is in the driver's seat today. Finally, 
a venture capitalist lets on over lunch that the real high-tech executive of the 
decade should not be Apple's Steve Jobs or the cofounders of Google but Sean 
Fanning, the kid behind the short-lived but trailblazing music "sharing" service, 
Napster (Gomes 2010, 38). 
The cycle has played out several times over the last few decades. A new 
technology is developed that allows for the duplication of a copyrighted work, copyright 
holders complain that the new technology will destroy their business, and arguments are 
fought in the courts and the legislatures. The result of each battle shapes the future of 
technological development for decades. This cycle has accelerated thanks to the growing 
amount of intellectual piracy over the internet. 
Currently, the biggest battle surrounds digital video. Ever since the introduction 
of the DVD and with it the ability to create perfect digital copies, the movie studios and 
the Motion Picture Artists Association (MPAA) have been attempting to install controls 
that would stop piracy of protected material. As the business model has migrated from 
physical discs into downloadable content, the studios have required that Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) be included and verified before a user can access legally purchased 
digital video materials. Their argument is that DRM prevents the spread of their property 
over the internet's thriving file-sharing services. 
Those in opposition to DRM argue that the biggest strength of the digital age is 
the ease in which users can share information with the world. They view DRM as a 
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significant barrier for the future development of the internet and consumer technology. 
By relaxing the DRM requirements surrounding video, users can utilize their Fair Use 
rights to rip, rearrange, and remix content to make interesting alternatives. In addition, 
the rules surrounding DRM make it difficult for technological innovation that is not 
sanctioned by the corporations that own the content. They believe that in order to help 
strengthen a free society, DRM should be abolished (Electronic Frontier Foundation 
2010). 
Because this DRM cycle has already played out over the last five years, it is 
important to go back and review how DRM was introduced in digital audio. DRM was an 
integral part of music purchased from online stores when it was first introduced, but 
eventually it was expunged from the service. Once the history is reviewed and the key 
elements that drove the abolishment of DRM are defined, the elements can be compared 
to today's climate in order to determine how the events of the past can inform the future 
of the industry. 
Audio 
On April 28, 2003, Apple released the iTunes Music Store alongside the third 
generation iPod.   For the first time, users were able to legally purchase music over the 
internet from a well-known company. It was a revolutionary move for the industry, 
attempting to reconcile the need of users to acquire digital music online with a 
corporation's profit margins. All of the major music labels decided to participate in the 
store, but only if DRM was included to prevent users from purchasing tracks and 
immediately uploading their data to file-sharing services. The iTunes Store was an 
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immediate success, selling over 25 million tracks by the end of the year (Wingfield and 
Smith 2003). 
For the music labels, it was an attempt to evolve to meet the needs of a changing 
market. For Apple, it was a calculated move to help improve the market share of the 
iPod: 
Apple has clearly designed all the parts of the iPod/iTunes system to create a 
“lock-in” effect that increases the loyalty of the iPod user base. Where this effect 
comes in is when an iPod user has already made a substantial investment in 
FairPlay-encoded content (and perhaps also in iPod accessories). Because that 
content cannot be used by a non-iPod player, the cost of switching to another 
system is effectively raised beyond simply the cost of new hardware. This makes 
it more likely that an obsolete iPod is replaced with another iPod (Sacconaghi Jr., 
Yin, and Garfunkel 2006, 60). 
With the success of the iTunes Store, other companies such as Microsoft, the 
revamped Napster, and Wal-Mart immediately began developing their own systems to 
cash in on the new marketplace. Various DRM systems were devised: the conglomeration 
of the PlaysForSure initiative, Apple's ever-evolving FairPlay, and server-based DRM 
used in Wal-Mart's initial store. DRM was an integral part of the business model. 
Fast forward six years later, and Apple announced that all of the music tracks in 
the iTunes Store would be sold without DRM (Cardew 2009). In the interim, Digital 
Rights Management changed from required technology to protect the intellectual property 
of the music labels into a hindrance for the future of the industry. The change was a result 
of two driving forces: technological innovations that helped to create and shape the 
digital music industry and consumer pressures that forced copyright holders and the 
companies that sold their product to eventually remove all forms of DRM. 
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Technological Innovations 
The first wave of technology that changed the way the user viewed their audio 
collection was the development and standardization of the personal computer as a music 
jukebox in the mid to late 1990s. As CD-ROM drives became cheaper and more reliable, 
programmers began to write encoding programs that would "rip" the data from a compact 
disc and store it as a lossy file on the user's hard drive. Soon programs such as Windows 
Media Player, MusicMatch Jukebox, and WinAmp became an essential part of a home 
computer (Mossberg 1999). Various audio codecs battled to become the dominant 
standard for the industry, with the open-source MP3 competing against RealNetworks' 
RealAudio and Microsoft's Windows Audio. Users were able to condense their 
collections into a format that favored portability and sharing. 
Napster took these collections and shared them with the world. Created by Shawn 
Fanning, a computer science student at Northeastern University in Boston, Napster 
enabled users to acquire music for their collections by searching and downloading files 
from other users via the internet. Prior to Napster, there were plenty of options for finding 
illicit music downloads on the internet (USENET, IRC, FTP, search engines, etc.), but 
they were unreliable and it was difficult to locate a specific song. Napster combined the 
communication tools of Internet Relay Chat, the file transfer technology inherent in 
Windows, and applications that allowed the searching of hard drive data to make the 
sharing of music files as easy as clicking a mouse.  
Napster was an immediate success when it debuted in 2000, peaking at 26.4 
million registered users during its two year lifespan (Greenfield, Taylor, and Thigpen 
2000). Users flocked to this new style of music acquisition, finding themselves plugged 
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into a worldwide net of music lovers willing to help Napster users discover and share 
new tracks for consumption. The application mirrored the experience of friends trading 
collections, just on a larger scale (Giesler and Pohlmann 2003). 
While Napster was quickly shut down through legal challenges, it popularized the 
concept of peer-to-peer sharing of music via the internet. The replacement technologies 
(KaZaa, BearShare, BitTorrent, etc.) were quickly embraced by the former users of 
Napster and the percentage of the population that used P2P systems continued to grow. 
This popularity helped to solidify the MP3 codec as the audio standard in the minds of 
the average user, because it was a universal format that could be played by any program 
in the market (Moody 2003). 
The final major technological revolution began with the introduction of the iPod. 
First released by Apple in 2001, users were finally able to listen to their digital music 
collection away from their computer. The concept was an immediate success, and other 
companies quickly introduced rival hardware to take advantage of the emerging market. 
The iPod quickly dominated the marketplace, gaining as much as 72% of the market 
share. The MP3 player soon became a necessity for the average user instead of a luxury. 
By 2003 users were able to easily acquire, rip, and share their digital audio 
collections outside of the typical revenue streams of the era. The market was ripe for a 
new paradigm to monetize the changing marketplace. 
Market Forces 
Apple parlayed the success of the iPod into the sale of digital music through the 
development of the iTunes store. They were able to eventually sign deals with all the 
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major music labels to sell individual tracks online for play on the user's computer and 
associated iPods because the purchased music was controlled through DRM. The ultimate 
business goal was to lock a user into a specific combination of store and device, ensuring 
that the user would remain a customer of Apple because of the inherent expense in 
switching services. Microsoft followed suit, creating the PlaysForSure initiative which 
allowed a multitude of devices to play tracks purchased from Microsoft-aligned stores 
and subscription services (including the newly-rebranded Napster). This plan was 
successful in the newly emerging digital audio marketplace. 
As the market matured, the major players realized that they needed to open up the 
system in order to continue to find profits. While the MP3 players were still being 
purchased, the number of new users poised to enter the marketplace began to dwindle. 
Eventually this issue led the executives of the online music stores to begin pushing for 
the abolishment of DRM, led by Steve Jobs of Apple. Apple's internal studies showed 
that 97% of music on the typical iPod lacked DRM, which showed that customers had no 
problem filling their devices with music from a non-iTunes source. Only 17% of iPod 
users purchased music from the iTunes Store on a monthly basis (Jobs 2007). He argued 
that the time had come for the music labels to relax their standards in terms of required 
copyright protection and let the market open up to increased consumer choice, with the 
secondary goal of allowing the music stores to compete in order to create the best 
product. 
The first store to offer DRM-free tracks was Amazon.com, which opened its MP3 
store in late 2007. Only selling tracks that they could legally sell as an MP3, they were an 
immediate success (Smith and Vara 2007). After Amazon began offering the option of 
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DRM-free music, other online stores were forced to follow or become irrelevant. As 
Apple started to renegotiate their contracts, more music transitioned to DRM-free 
versions until all DRM was abolished in 2009 (Frakes, Seff, and Snell 2009). Microsoft 
changed their agreements in order to remain competitive, and online DRM servers were 
shut down to the detriment of the users who suddenly found their music unplayable. 
Except for the subscription-based services, all other stores online were forced to remove 
DRM in order to compete. 
With the death of DRM, users who purchased an audio track online would own it 
as long as they were in possession of the file and would be able to transfer the music to 
another appliance. There was no longer a reason to be "locked in" to a particular device 
or store. Businesses were allowed to compete for market share through their innovation, 
not as a result of DRM-enforced inertia. 
Video - Similarities and differences 
At its surface, the new video market appears to be on the same path that audio 
forged a few years earlier. However, there are some key differences in the way that the 
copyright holders approached this new market in order to help strengthen their positions 
in the digital age. 
Technological Innovations 
Just as users gained the ability to rip, convert, and remix compact discs around the 
turn of the century, the same technology needs to be as widely available for users to 
extract content from their DVD collections. It was the fact that the MP3 was so easy to 
create, obtain, and share that helped to evolve the marketplace to the point where DRM 
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became a liability. Without user-friendly, easily acquirable, and ubiquitous technological 
alternatives to the online stores, the copyright holders would have no reason to allow for 
negotiations about the removal of DRM. 
Consumers have always wanted to merge their computers with their televisions. 
The personal computer is an excellent appliance for video playback of legal and illegal 
files, but until recently the average monitor size was not appropriate for family room 
viewing. Adding a video card to a personal computer would enable footage to be 
broadcast in a more consumer-friendly environment. With the release of the Video 
section of the iTunes Store alongside the iPod Video in 2005, the digital video revolution 
began. Legal portable video soon became a reality for most users. The current generation 
of game consoles are capable of playing most of the popular video codecs from a hard 
drive, memory stick, or home network and display the video on the living room big 
screen television. Set-top media boxes such as Apple's AppleTV, Google's proposed 
GoogleTV, and other media-center software packages such as MythTV, X-Box Media 
Center, and Boxee are vying for the user's pocketbook as the ideal audio/visual 
component for the living room. 
The technology exists to rip and convert a DVD disc into portable video files, but 
unlike the audio CDs the technology has to contend with DRM. Just as many VHS tapes 
were protected by Macrovision, the emerging DVD market had its own anti-copying 
protections. The first major DVD encryption method, Content Scramble System (CSS), 
was cracked in 1999 for the purpose of allowing DVDs to be played in the unsupported 
Linux operating system (Camp 2002). With that knowledge, hackers gained the ability to 
copy the files from a DVD and manipulate the data. Despite the resulting application 
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(DeCSS) being declared illegal in the United States in 2000 (Eschenfelder 2005), the code 
is still freely available on the World Wide Web. This breakthrough allowed applications 
to be created to make backup copies of a user's collection, extract video or audio for 
editing purposes, store the data as an image file on the hard drive, and encoding into 
smaller formats such as MPEG-4.  Any user with the proper audio/video codecs installed 
on their system could take the encoded files and view the content in a compatible device 
or burn the video to a DVD. Other encryption methods have been developed, but hackers 
are always quick to circumvent them because DVDs need to be compatible with older 
hardware. 
Users who want to copy or convert their movie collections have a myriad of 
solutions, available to anyone with an internet connection. A simple Google search will 
list guides and links to software for the sole purpose of ripping DVDs. However, none of 
these software packages have been universally accepted as a solution. Each time a 
possible business plan is created to enable more consumer control over their media 
collection it runs afoul of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 
The DMCA was the latest plan by copyright holders to control the ability of 
computers to make perfect digital copies of media. This was preceded by the Audio 
Home Recording Act (AHRA) in 1992 with the goal of enforcing existing DRM plans 
and collecting royalties from the sale of devices that existed solely to make perfect digital 
copies of media. Signed into law before the MP3 codec was released in 1995, it was 
unsuccessful at stopping the ripping of compact discs because the personal computer was 
not a dedicated instrument of piracy. Hard drives and CD-ROMs were capable of perfect 
duplication, but their primary purpose was the storage and retrieval of data. While the 
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computer could be used for piracy, this was a secondary feature. The computer's 
flexibility led to its immunity from the Act (Landau 2002). 
The music industry also attempted to use the AHRA to shut down the fledgling 
MP3 player industry. Diamond Media created an MP3 player called the Rio in 1998, 
which had the capability to store an hour of MP3 content. The Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) sued to prevent the sale of the device without the 
protections required by the AHRA (Allemann 2000). Because the Rio was able to make a 
perfect copy of an MP3, the RIAA argued that it was in violation of the AHRA and sales 
should stop until it could be modified to become compliant. 
The judge presiding over the case did not agree. MP3s uploaded to the Rio were 
locked to that particular device. The Rio did not create its own files, only transferred 
copies that were made in another location. There was no way to export the tracks from 
the Rio onto another computer, so the device already had built-in DRM. In addition, the 
ability to use the Rio as a Dictaphone helped classify the Rio as a multi-use device. Just 
like the personal computer had a multitude of uses beyond just ripping music, the Rio 
was more than just a digital Walkman. The result of the ruling was that MP3 players were 
legal extensions of a user's Fair Use rights (Starrett 1999). The precedents set in the case 
helped define the abilities of current MP3 players. 
The DMCA's goal was to further protect the rights of copyright holders as the 
power of the personal computer and the internet continued to expand. With the exploding 
popularity of the internet and the potential threat to the newly-emerging DVD market, the 
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media companies felt that they needed to protect their investments. The DMCA was a 
major victory for the studios. 
The main article of the DMCA relating to DRM is: 
No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a work protected under [the copyright] title (DMCA 1998). 
In other words, any program or technology that exists to circumvent or nullify 
existing DRM schema is illegal and cannot be sold or disseminated in the United States. 
The DMCA was essential in the case against DeCSS, which allowed users of the software 
to access scrambled content without paying for a CSS decoding license. Even posting a 
link to the DeCSS software is a violation of the DMCA. 
The combination of the DMCA and DVD encryption has been used repeatedly to 
restrict the development and distribution of a simple, user-friendly DVD-ripping solution. 
The first major test was Macrovision vs. 321 Studios. 321 Studios created a suite of 
software entitled DVD X Copy that enabled users to make copies of their DVD 
collections. The user had the option to remove all forms of copy protection, including 
Macrovision's anti-analog DRM. Macrovision sued, stating that the removal of their copy 
protection was a violation of the DMCA. After a three year fight in the courts, 
Macrovision won and 321 Studios was forced to stop selling the product (Katz et al. 
2004).  
A more recent example came in 2008 when RealNetworks released their 
RealDVD software. RealDVD's purpose was to rip the contents of a DVD to a hard drive 
while still maintaining the DRM protection inherent in the disc. RealNetworks believed 
that because they owned a license to legally decrypt protected DVD content and it was 
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incorporated in the system, they were within their rights to design software that would 
enable users to "space shift" their data from physical discs to a hard drive in a restricted 
format. The ripped data could not be shared with other users (Salcedo 2008). 
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) quickly filed lawsuits to 
stop the sale of RealDVD. They argued that that because the software enabled users to 
view the content of DVDs without the physical disc being present, they violated the 
licensing agreement of the CSS license (Netherby 2009). The case quickly went against 
RealNetworks, and they settled with the MPAA in 2009 (Shwiff 2010). 
Because a majority of DVDs sold in the United States are protected by some form 
of copy protection, it is impossible to design a software package that can emulate the 
jukebox-style audio functionality of iTunes or Windows Media Player. Any business plan 
dependent on the breaking of DVD encryption has to be prepared for legal attacks if the 
company wants to ultimately be a success. 
Despite these setbacks, digital ripping of video content thrives. DVD-quality 
copies of major movies are released to the internet days in advance of their commercial 
release. 96% of all Oscar Nominated films have high quality copies available on the 
internet by Oscar night (Baio 2010). Television episodes are usually available for 
download via BitTorrent or USENET within an hour of the end of the broadcast. Users 
no longer are forced to wait for a television series to be broadcast in their country because 
they can download copies ripped in another market. A study of typical BitTorrent traffic 
concluded that 99% of all content in file-sharing networks is in violation of some form of 
copyright (Felten 2010).  
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The technology exists to assist home users in creating their own home video 
jukebox, but the marketplace does not help the spread of the technology. The DMCA is 
currently preventing progress in that area, to the satisfaction of the studios. Because an 
alternative business plan is not allowed to exist, there is no incentive for the MPAA and 
television networks to change their positions regarding DRM. Should a case succeed in 
striking down some of the DMCA protections that the studios enjoy, they may have to 
reconsider their positions. 
Market Forces 
Electronic video entertainment (DVDs, Blu-Ray, Video-on-Demand, etc.) is still a 
significant portion of the United States' economy, accounting for $20 billion in sales in 
2009. While digital video sales increased by 32% in the last year (Digital Entertainment 
Group 2009), the market is beginning to show signs of weakness. DVD sales are 
dropping rapidly, and Blu-Ray releases are not selling fast enough to fill the gap. Brick 
and mortar DVD rentals declined in the first quarter of 2010 while online rental services 
such as Netflix and Blockbuster Online continued to gain market share. 
The rise in the prominence of streaming media has revolutionized the way users 
treat video content. Streaming video was very primitive around the turn of the century, as 
the bandwidth and technology required for on-demand video had not been developed to 
the point where it was feasible. Until recently, the user's relationship with online video 
was fairly limited. That relationship changed with the debut of YouTube in 2005. 
Because YouTube allowed users to upload their own content for rebroadcast via a 
browser-neutral interface, both the company and the concept of on-demand video quickly 
gained the attention of the internet populace. 
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The new technology was quickly embraced by enthusiasts and pirates alike. With 
some minor video editing and a few clicks of a mouse, users could upload whole movies 
and television series onto the web. Because YouTube initially relied on feedback from 
users to determine copyright infringement, anything could be uploaded and viewed 
within minutes (Meisel 2009). Just as Napster helped make finding a specific audio track 
easier, sites like YouTube made finding a specific video clip as simple as a Google 
search. 
The response by the copyright holders was not initially positive. The arguments 
were similar to the cases used during the rise of Napster: YouTube's business model 
existed to make a profit off of the infringement of copyrighted material. The most 
prominent ongoing case is Viacom v. YouTube, in which Viacom argues that YouTube 
should pay for the profit that they gained thanks to the broadcast of clips from popular 
Viacom shows such as The Daily Show and The Colbert Report. YouTube took the same 
argument as Napster: they are protected as a service provider under the DMCA's safe 
harbor laws (Allen 2007). Despite the lawsuits, YouTube's business model was strong 
and clones quickly popped up across the web. 
While the corporations were fighting YouTube in court, they also began to 
understand the power of streaming media to improve their bottom line. Soon the 
networks and studios began to embrace the new paradigm on the web. The CBS network 
made a deal with YouTube to create their own channel on the site, ABC built its own 
streaming application, and NBC and FOX partnered to create Hulu, an alternative online 
streaming destination. Even Viacom, while suing YouTube, was using the service as a 
marketing tool by secretly uploading clips (Kravets 2010). 
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Hulu is the most successful of the major streaming initiatives, eventually 
convincing ABC to join the service in 2009. Because of YouTube and Hulu's influence, 
there are very few shows on television that do not have streaming alternatives available 
after the broadcast. The networks provide the on-demand content that users crave, but 
still retain control over how it is distributed. The typical service only displays a few of 
the most recent episodes for consumption, and inserts advertising to gain income from the 
broadcast of episodes. The networks also update their systems to foil third-party 
applications that broadcast content without the permission of the provider. 
Meanwhile, users treat video content in radically different ways than audio. Audio 
content by its nature lends itself to collecting. Users who purchase a CD in a store and rip 
the content to their hard drive or download an album online will keep the digital files as 
long as they have access to the bytes that make up the tracks. Because storage capacity 
continues to increase in size and decrease in price, there is no reason for users to purge 
their collections of rarely-used files. Once a user has purchased/downloaded an album, 
the user will keep it for life. 
Users' relationship with video is more ephemeral, and has been in the years before 
the digital revolution. When the time comes for users to make a decision about procuring 
a movie, not only to they have to decide upon the film to view but they also need to 
decide whether to rent or buy. Economic models state that the decision is based upon the 
price of the material and the likelihood that the user will consume the media enough 
times to make up for the differences in price. However, when the user is presented with 
the option of rent vs. buy in a store the user tends to incorrectly estimate the number of 
viewings for a particular film. The rent vs. buy decision is also adjusted by the location of 
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the purchase (Blockbuster vs. Best Buy) and the genre of movie (action vs. documentary) 
(Milkman, Rogers, and Bazerman 2009). Because the video market has a built in rental 
option that does not have a universal match in the audio market, many users only want to 
view content a single time before discarding it. 
The rise of online streaming services such as Netflix has taken advantage of this 
difference in attitude. Consumers are more likely to sign up for a "bulk" option that is 
more convenient, such as a subscription to Netflix or Blockbuster Online, even if they are 
unlikely to use it enough to warrant the price (Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). Because the 
user is not paying ala carte for content, they do not see an unutilized subscription as a loss 
of value (Soman and Gourville 2001). This difference also helps the service provider, 
saving them money in shipping and bandwidth. It creates a solid relationship that allows 
the user to receive the content that they want to consume at a level of commitment and 
cost that is appealing. 
Many online retailers and rental companies had long realized that the future of 
video media is not the physical disc but on-demand streaming of content. Currently, the 
movie studios are starting to adjust their business models to allow for increased access to 
streaming content while still helping the sales of DVDs. New deals are being formed to 
create a special four-week release windows between the release of a film on a DVD and 
its availability in Netflix-like services. The goal is to spur the sales of DVDs with the 
promise of more films being cleared for streaming in the future. If this collaboration is 
successful, streaming content may finally reach the point where all video content will be 
on-demand via subscription in the coming years. 
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If on-demand content becomes the driving force in the industry, then there would 
be no reason for the studios to entertain the thought of removing DRM. Part of the forces 
that drove the eradication of DRM from digital audio was the prevalence of DRM-free 
copies. If most content is eventually streamed into the user's living room, then DRM is 
required to enforce the security of the system. Users will have to be authenticated, and 
the service providers will be required to protect the integrity of the content. While this 
may be a perfect medium between "free data" and the need of the studios to protect their 
investment, it would never be considered a DRM-free solution. 
Conclusion 
It is unlikely that Digital Rights Management will be removed from digital video 
content over the next few years. The DMCA's restrictive effect on technological 
innovation without the blessing of the copyright holders and the relative ease of on-
demand streaming content are creating a marketplace where content is accessible via the 
internet instead of being stored locally. Just as data is migrating into the Cloud, users do 
not feel the need to obsessively collect video files of everything they consume for 
archival purposes like they would with audio. The current generation of video delivery 
systems are growing to hopefully meet the need of the general populace, unlike the music 
stores that appeared online after the MP3 revolution. 
The eradication of audio DRM required a marketplace that forced the music labels 
to renegotiate. Video DRM would require a similar economic need for the studios to 
change their attitudes, but because content is so easily available and accessible via current 
business models it is unlikely that there will be a major revolution in technology that does 
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not directly involve the copyright holders. Although the will for DRM's eradication will 
always exist, it appears that digital video DRM will stay for years to come. 
Future Work 
The environment is in a constant state of flux. DRM ideologies will continue to 
clash as new technologies, legislative proposals, and legal battles are introduced and have 
an effect on public opinion. Recently, a round of lawsuits were filed against users who 
downloaded independent movies online in a blatant attempt to coerce settlement fees. A 
hardware company is fighting the DMCA in court in an attempt to continue to sell their 
video jukebox solution to consumers. A new copyright protection act is working its way 
towards Congress. The fate of Net Neutrality could severely restrict the effectiveness of 
P2P networking and new streaming content options. 
At the same time, new markets of digital content are beginning the battle over 
DRM. The surge in the popularity of eBooks thanks to devices like Amazon's Kindle and 
Apple's iPad has pushed the industry into similar DRM territory. Books bought from one 
store cannot be transferred to a competing store's device. Software developers, and 
gaming companies in particular, are developing more sophisticated DRM schemes to 
attempt to reduce the amount of piracy with the side-effect of possibly locking out legal 
copies. As hackers crack the software's DRM, the developers design more restrictive 
schemes. 
There is so much rhetoric on both sides of the argument that it is difficult to gain 
hard data on the future course of DRM. One area of study would be the changing 
attitudes of the consumer towards digital media, DRM, and piracy. Has the rise in online 
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streaming and subscription options helped reduce the need for piracy for the typical user? 
Does participation in a service such as Netflix increase or reduce the need to download 
video, and why? What is the real financial penalty to a corporation that insists on 
including DRM, and can the benefit from removing DRM be quantified? 
With appropriate studies and objective results, it may be possible to design a 
solution that is as beneficial to the consumer as to the corporation. 
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